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Abstract
The conventional wisdom is that indirect network effects, unlike direct network
effects, do not give rise to externalities. In this paper we show that under very
general conditions, indirect network effects lead to adoption externalities. In
particular we show that in markets where consumption beneﬁts arise from hard-
ware/software systems, adoption externalities will occur when there are (i) in-
creasing returns to scale in the production of software, (ii) free-entry in software,
and (iii) consumers have a preference for software variety. The private beneﬁt of
the marginal hardware purchaser is less than the social beneﬁt since the marginal
hardware purchaser does not internalize the welfare improving response of the
software industry, particularly the increase in software variety, on inframarginal
purchasers when the market for hardware expands.
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A network effect exists if consumption beneﬁts depend positively on the total
number of consumers who purchase compatible products.1 Katz and Shapiro
(1985) distinguished between direct and indirect network effects. A direct ef-
fect arises when there is “a direct physical effect of the number of purchasers
on the quality of the product” (p. 424). Katz and Shapiro (1994) term networks
witha directphysical effect“communicationnetworks”,and (notsurprisingly)the
canonical examples are communication technologies such as telephone networks
and facsimile standards where it is intuitive that the value of joining a network
depends on the number of other consumers who join by adopting the same, or a
compatible, technology.
When the network effect is indirect, consumption beneﬁts do not depend di-
rectly on the size of the network (the total number of consumers who purchase
compatible products) per se. Rather individuals care about the decisions of oth-
ers because of the effect that has on the incentive for the provision of comple-
mentary products. Users of Macintosh computers are better off the greater the
number of consumers who purchase Macs because the larger the number of Mac
users the greater the demand for compatible software, which if matched by an
appropriate supply response—entry by software ﬁrms—will lead to lower prices
and/or a greater variety of software which makes all Mac users better off. This
hardware/software paradigm applies to many markets, including most consumer
electronic technologies, including video-cassette recorders, televisions, and audio
technologies. However, it is not restricted to consumer electronics: other ex-
amples include natural gas fueled automobiles (hardware) and natural gas ﬁlling
stations (software); yellow pages (hardware) and listings (software); ATM/ABM
cards (hardware) and compatible teller machines (software). Katz and Shapiro
(1994)suggest that hardware/softwaresystemscan beviewed as “virtualnetworks
1The seminal modern contributions on network effects are a series of papers by Farrell and
Saloner (1985, 1986a, 1986b) and Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986). See Liebowitz and Margolis
(2002) for a discussion of historical antecedents.
1which have similar properties as direct networks.2
In the case of direct network effects it is relatively uncontroversial that they
can give rise to a network, or adoption, externality. Individuals when they join
a network characterized by direct network effects do so on the basis of their pri-
vate beneﬁts and do not take into account that others on the network are also
made better off by their decision to join. There has, however, been considerable
disagreement in the literature over whether indirect network effects give rise to
network externalities.
Liebowitz and Margolis in a series of contributions have argued that the term
“ externality” was used carelessly in reference to indirect network effects and that
some researchers in using the term externality—with its connotation of market
failure—have forgotten the importance of the distinction between technological
and pecuniary externalities established in the 1920s.3 Liebowitz and Margolis
(1994,p.139) arguethat indirect networkeffects“describenothing morethan wel-
fare neutral interactions that occur in properly functioning markets” and thus do
not give rise to an externality in the modern sense since they do not result in any
welfare losses. The rationale for this dismissal is the assessment that “indirect
network effects are ‘market mediated effects’ such as cases where complemen-
tary goods (e.g. toner cartridges) are more readily available or lower in price as
the number of users of a good (laser printers) increases.” (1998, p. 671) As a
result, these “market mediated (read price) effects are likely pecuniary” (1994, p.
2See Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1994); Farrell and Saloner (1985); Chou and Shy (1990); and
Church and Gandal (1992 1993).
3Liebowitz and Margolis (2002, p.79): “The early modern literature on network externality
discusses direct and indirect network externalities, but does not acknowledge that the two have
distincteconomic properties. As a consequence, this literaturerepeats some mistakes of Marshall,
Pigou, and others regarding pecuniary externalities.” Or Liebowitz and Margolis (1994, p. 137):
“Today this distinctionbetween technological and pecuniary externalities has largely been forgot-
ten, perhaps because it is no longer needed to correct Pigou. But the trap that caught Pigou is still
set, ready to spring on the unwary analyst. In fact, the pecuniary externalities that so perplexed
Pigou walk and quack very much likethe indirect network externalities that are waddling through
the literature today.” Liebowitz and Margolis have made essentially the same argument regard-
ing indirect network effects in a number of contributions. These include, at least, Liebowitz and
Margolis (1994, 1995, 1998, and 2002).
2138), not true externalities which impose welfare losses if left uninternalized.4
The objective of this paper is to establish the circumstances when network
effects give rise to “real” externalities and Liebowitz and Margolis’ fundamental
point that indirect network effects are most likely pecuniary externalities is incor-
rect and misleading. Circumstances, it appears to us, that characterize most hard-
ware/software examples. In particular we demonstrate that the key indirect net-
work effect—giving rise to a network externality—is a variety effect not a price
effect. We demonstrate that the issue is not that toner cartridges become more
readily available or lower in price as more people use laser printers. The issue is
that marginal consumers do not account for the effect that extending the hardware
network will have on the variety of software, and thus the beneﬁt inframarginal
consumers receive from being able to consume additional software varieties. It
is the number of different software varieties that is important, not the quantity
(or price) of a particular software variety. Therefore, contrary to Liebowitz and
Margolis (1994, 1995, 1998, 2002), indirect network externalities are the result of
variety effects, not price effects.
The critical requirements for indirect network effects to give rise to an adop-
tion externality are three-fold: (i) increasing returns to scale in the production of
software; (ii) free-entry into software; and (iii) consumer preferences for software
variety. Under these circumstances we demonstrate using a simple model the ex-
istence of a positive adoption externality in a setting where consumption beneﬁts
arise from consuming systems composed of hardware and software, where the
consumption beneﬁts of hardwareare increasing in the variety of compatible soft-
4A pecuniary externality is a wealth transfer which imposes a privatecost but not a social one.
A technologicalor“modern” externalityimposes asocial cost,and asocial costreduces thewealth
of society where as a private cost rearranges that wealth. Posner (1998, p.7) notes “competition
is a rich source of pecuniary’ as distinct from ‘technological’ externalities – that is, of wealth
transfers from, as distinct from cost impositionson, unconsenting parties. Suppose A opens a gas
stationopposite B’s gas stationand as a result siphons revenues from B. Since B’s loss is A’s gain,
there is no diminutionin overall wealth and hence no social cost, even thoughB is harmed by A’s
competition and thus incurs a private cost.” Therefore, while each ﬁrm acts in a way that harms
the other ﬁrms in the industry, that harm is more than offset by transfers of surplus among ﬁrms
and to consumers.
3ware. The marginal adopter does not take into account the beneﬁts that accrue to
inframarginaladoptersfrom theresponseof thesoftwareindustryto an increasein
hardware sales. When there are increasing returns to scale and free-entry into the
production of differentiated software the key response to an increase in hardware
sales is an increase in software variety which beneﬁts inframarginal consumers.
The manner in which inframarginal consumers beneﬁt from indirect effects is
identical to the manner in which they beneﬁt when there are direct effects, the
ability to create new systems of complementary products. Network externalities
that arise in settings with indirect network effectshave thesame microfoundations
as network externalities that rise in settings with direct network effects.
Section 2 explains why the microfoundations of direct and indirect network
effects are identical, and in doing so justiﬁes the assumption that consumers are
likely to have a preference for variety. The assumptions of our formal model are
set out in Section 3.5 In Section 4 we ﬁnd the market equilibrium and in Section
5 we derive the efﬁcient allocation. In Section 6 we demonstrate the inefﬁciency
of the market equilibrium by showing that the equilibrium market network size is
smaller than the socially optimal size. Section 7 offers a brief conclusion.
2 Microfoundations of Network Beneﬁts
Though it seems intuitively obvious that communications networks give rise to
network beneﬁts and an adoption externality, in the context of the debate over
whether indirect network effects give rise to a similar adoption externality it is
illuminating to ask why.6 A more general perspective on both direct and indirect
5The model presented here shares features with the work of Chou and Shy (1990) and Church
and Gandal (1992, 1993). However, the existing literatureis concerned with competition between
different networks and a focus on whether the optimal technology was adopted in the market
equilibrium, not whether adoption of a technology is sub-optimal and whether indirect network
effects lead to network externalities.
6Our analysis here is based on, and extends, that of Economides and White (1998). Econo-
mides and White (1998) discuss both direct and indirectnetworkeffects, but they do notcomment
on whether they are pecuniary or technological, referring the reader to Liebowitz and Margolis
(1994). Nor do they model indirect network effects.
4network effects recognizes that in both cases—and what is perhaps the deﬁning
feature of a network—the products demanded are systems of components. Con-
sumer demand is for a group of complementary products that when combined,
or consumed, together provide value. It is often the case that the components by
themselves have very little value.
A direct network consists of complements linked together to form a network.
In this case horizontal compatibility allowsfor interconnection of the product pur-
chased by a consumer with that of others. The classic example is a local telephone
exchange. Consumers gain access to thenetworkwhen they subscribeby purchas-
ing a link from their location to the local switch. For a call to be made requires
that both the caller and the person called have such a link and value is created by
combining the two links through the switch. In this case the system that creates
value is comprised of two complementary goods—the link of the caller and the
link of the person called to the switch.
When an extra individual joins a network of n individuals, in addition to the
n potential types of systems that are open to the new individual, the link of the
new subscriber creates new systems for the n inframarginal adopters or existing
subscribers. The addition of a new individual to an n individual network creates
n new systems—combinations of complements that can be connected by existing
subscribers to create a new good. It is this creation of new systems for existing
subscribers/adopters that is the beneﬁt to existing subscribers of network expan-
sion and the source of the network externality.
As in the direct network externality case, when there are indirect network
effects consumers beneﬁt from the adoption by others of compatiblehardwarebe-
cause it allows them to consume a wider variety of systems. In this case consump-
tion beneﬁts ﬂow from creating systems consisting of one unit of hardware and
one unit of software and the unit of hardware is typically compatible with many
different varieties of software. If consumers value variety, then they will demand
multiple systems, each involving one unit of hardware and a different variety of
5software.7 The advantage of more adopters of hardware to an existing subscriber
arises if an increase in hardware adoption induces the production of more soft-
ware varieties since existing adopters will then beneﬁt from being able to create
more two component systems. Adoption externalites that arise from both direct




Weassume that thepreferencesofconsumers aredeﬁned over hardware,software,
and a competitively supplied outside good. The tastes of consumers for hardware
are distributed uniformly along a line of unit length, the population is normalized
to one, and all consumers have income of
y. The consumption of a hardware
technology different from the most preferred type imposes a utility cost on the
consumer that is proportional to the distance separating the consumer and the
hardware technology consumed.
The utility of a consumer located distance












7It is a rare individual indeed who listens to only one compact disc on their stereo, uses only
one application program on their PC, or plays only one video game on their video game console.
8This systems creation beneﬁt shares some similarity to that found in the “mix and match”
literature (Matutes and Regibeau 1988; Economides 1989) in that consumers beneﬁt from an in-
crease in the variety of components of a system. Typically in that literatureﬁrms produce the two
components of a system. Compatibilityenables consumers to build a system that is closer to their
ideal since compatibilityincreases the number of available systems in a duopolyfrom twoto four.
However, our framework differs from that of the mix and match literature in a couple of ways.
Unlikethe mix and match framework we assume that consumers have a preference for consuming
a variety of systems—not just one—and the number of systems is determined endogenously by
free entry in software. It is these two features, free-entry and a preference for variety, along with
increasing returns to scale in software, that lead to adoption externalities when there are indirect
network effects.
6where
M is the number of software varieties consumed,
x is consumption of the
competitively supplied numeraire good, and
k measures the degree of hardware
differentiation. The network beneﬁt function is
M
￿. We assume that demand for
both a unit of hardwareand any given variety of software is completely inelastic.9





1 so that, while the networkbeneﬁt is increas-
ing in the number of software varieties consumed, the marginal beneﬁt of another
variety is declining.
Every consumer who purchases a unit of hardware maximizes their utility by


















j is the price of a unit of software variety
j,
y is the income of the con-
sumer,
p is the priceof the hardwaretechnology, and
M is the number of software
varieties purchased.
Each consumer optimally selects the number and varieties of software to con-
sume by ranking the software varieties in ascending order by price. The marginal





1. Ignoring the integer problem, the







) for a consumer who purchases hard-



















h most expensive software variety. In other words, the con-




h lowest-priced varieties, where
c
N is such that








9Demand is not perfectly inelastic, since above a certain price consumers no longer purchase
the product. However, up to that price demand is perfectly inelastic and henceforth demand will
be referred to as being completely inelastic. Examples of different software varieties for personal
computers are a spreadsheet, word processor, database, etc.
10We ignore the possibility that such an
b
N might not exist. We show below that equilibrium
pricing behaviour by software ﬁrms will ensure that it does.



































The marginal consumer is indifferent between only consuming the numeraire
good and purchasing hardware. Setting (4) equal to
y, the utility from consuming
























0. Equivalently the size of the network is the demand func-
tion for hardware. The demand for hardware depends not only on the price of
hardware, but also the number and prices of compatible software varieties.
3.2 Technology
We assume that the competitive suppliers of hardware all offer a product located
at one end of the unit interval. We also assume that there are constant returns to
scale in the production of hardware. Let the constant unit cost of hardware be
equal to
c. Our assumption of competition in the provision of hardware means
that the price of hardware will be equal to




We assume that the production of software is characterized by increasing re-
turns to scale: the marginal production cost of a unit of variety is zero, but asso-
ciated with each software variety is a ﬁxed cost equal to
f.11 Software ﬁrms are
restricted to providing only a single software variety and there is free entry into
the software industry.
11Given that demand for a unit of hardware and each variety of software is completely inelastic
for an individual consumer, the assumption of zero marginal cost in either hardware or software
has no effect on the results. This assumption is made to simplifythe presentation.
83.3 Timing
We assume asimple two-stagegameand solve forthe subgameperfect Nash equi-
librium (SPNE). In the second stage the number of software varieties is ﬁxed and
thereis pricecompetition between softwareﬁrms, and given the Nash equilibrium
in software (and hardware) prices, consumers make their adoption decision. The
assumption of competitive hardware means that the Nash equilibrium hardware
price is simply its marginal cost. In the ﬁrst stage there is free-entryintosoftware.
The effect of subgame perfection is that software ﬁrms anticipate correctly the
dependence of second period equilibrium prices, hardware adoption, and proﬁts
on the number of software varieties.12
4 Market Equilibrium
4.1 Nash Equilibrium in Software Prices
The determination of the Nash equilibrium in software prices in the second stage
when there are
N software ﬁrmsinvolves two steps: (i) ﬁnding equilibrium prices
assuming that software ﬁrms believe that the size of the network, i.e. hardware
sales, are invariant to software pricing; and (ii) showing that software ﬁrms will
in fact price as if the size of the network is ﬁxed, since a single software ﬁrm will
not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to lower its price in order to induce more consumers to join
the network by buying hardware.
4.1.1 Step 1: Hardware Sales Invariant to Software Pricing
Suppose that there are
N software ﬁrms which have each developed a single soft-
ware variety, and contrary to the rules of the game, consumers have already pur-
chased hardware so that the size of the network is ﬁxed. Then the Nash equilib-
12We adopt a two-stage game for ease of presentation. The Nash equilibrium to a simple static
game where pricing and entry by software ﬁrms occur simultaneously is identical to that of the
SPNE in the two-stage game considered here.

















1 (its marginal beneﬁt), con-






is unchanged as the demand by a consumer for a variety of software is completely
inelastic and the market size is assumed to be ﬁxed.






















4.1.2 Step 2: An Individual Software Firm Does Not Have an Incentive to
Price to Expand Network Size
However given the rules of the game, the size of the network is not ﬁxed: from
(5) it depends on the price of every software variety. While it is clear that no
software ﬁrm will ever charge a price higher than (6)— since its sales would then
be zero—we need to determine whether a software ﬁrm might ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to unilaterally deviate from (6) and charge a lower price in order to induce more










t is given by equation (5). The change in the revenue of ﬁrm j given a


















Decreasing thepriceofits softwarevarietymarginallywilldecrease itsrevenueby
t, the loss in revenue on inframarginal units. A marginal reduction in
￿
j increases










k. An upper bound on the






























2 theNash equilibriumin software prices














































The decrease in revenue on the inframarginal units is greater than the increase in



































1a reduction in the price of
software below (6) by ﬁrm
j reduces revenue on inframarginal units but does not
increase quantity. Pricesgreater than (6) result in sales of zero since price exceeds
marginal beneﬁt for all consumers.






its marginal beneﬁt and all consumers who purchase hardware consume one unit
of each software product.
4.2 Nash Equilibrium in Software Variety
In the ﬁrst stage of the game there is free entry into software. The equilibrium
number of software ﬁrms (and thus varieties) will be determined by the free-entry
condition of zero proﬁts given the equilibrium software price (6).
11The equilibrium proﬁts of a software ﬁrm when there are

















Substituting (6) into (12) and setting the result equal to zero implicitly deﬁnes the





















free-entry equilibrium is deﬁned by the simultaneous solution of (7) and (13).13










all consumers adopt the hardware. Whether the equilibrium involves universal
adoption or not depends on the relationship between the extent of hardware dif-
ferentiation and the value of software.
The effect of entry by another software ﬁrm (which supplies an additional

































The ﬁrst term in (14) captures the competitive effect of additional entry: an
additional competitor reduces equilibrium software prices. The second term cap-
tures the network effect: additional software makes purchasing hardware more
attractive and hence extends the hardware market. If the second effect dominates,
software ﬁrms will continue to enter the market until the market is covered, at
which point the network effect is zero.14 The existence of an interior equilibrium
requires that entry from an additional ﬁrm will reduce proﬁts.
13The Nash equilibrium to an alternative game in which pricing and entry by software ﬁrms
occurs simultaneously would be found by solving the same two equations. In this case
N in (7)
would be the expected number of software varieties, which if consumers have rational expecta-




) in (13)is expected market size, whichunder rationalexpectations
i sg i v e nb y( 7 ) .
14This terminologyis consistent with the analysis and terminologyused by Church and Gandal
(1992)intheiranalysisoftheincentivesofsoftwareﬁrms tosupplycomplementary productswhen
there are competing hardware products/networks.
12However, this is not sufﬁcient for an interior equilibrium. It must also be the
case that the number of software ﬁrms which enter in the interior equilibrium is
less than the number required to induce every consumer to purchase hardware or
join the market. This implies a restriction on
f.
Proposition 2

































then the equilibrium network size
t












































































































Proof. Substituting in the equilibrium network size given by (7) and the equilib-
rium software price given by (6) into the expression for proﬁts of a software ﬁrm
























The equilibrium number of software ﬁrms will exceed 1 (recall from Proposition



















For theinteriorequilibriumnumberof softwarevarieties, set (18)equal to zero
and solve for
N. For the equilibrium network size, insert the result into (7).

































































































The equilibrium number of software varieties will be less than the number re-
quired for full market coverage provided












































1in (13) and solving for
N.
5 Social Optimum
In this section we derive the efﬁcient network size. In the ﬁrst-best allocation the
social planner selects both network size (
t
s) and the number of software varieties
(
N
s) to maximize welfare. In the second-best allocation the social planner can
only mandate adoption of the hardware technology and cannot determine directly
the number of software varieties. In the second-best allocation the social planner
knows that for any
t
s, the variety of software will be determined by the free-entry
condition, (13).
5.1 First-Best Allocation
































The ﬁrst term of (23) is the direct utility of those consumers on the network
and the second term in (23) is the utility of those not on the network. Since
proﬁts in both hardware and software will be zero, only the surplus of consumers
is relevant. In the ﬁrst-best allocation the social planner maximizes (23) subject

























Integrating (23) and (24) and then substituting in the resource constraint, the ﬁrst-

























s, i.e. the extent of the network (hardware quantity) and
software varieties.








































The ﬁrst term in (26) is the marginal social beneﬁt of another software variety
(the product of marginal utility and network size) and the second is the marginal
social cost of another variety. The ﬁrst term in (27) is the marginal social beneﬁt
to expanding the hardware network; the second term the marginal social cost.
5.2 Second-Best Allocation
In the second-best allocation the social planner can only determine the size of
the hardware network and the number of software varieties is determined by free-













































The ﬁrst term of (28) is the indirect utility of those consumers on the network
and thesecond termin(28)istheindirectutilityofthosenot on thenetwork. Since
proﬁts in both hardware and software will be zero, only the surplus of consumers
is relevant. The constraint isthefreeentry, zero-proﬁtcondition which determines




16Integrating (28) and substituting in the deﬁnition of
N
s from the constraint the



































In this simplemodel the ﬁrst-best and second-best allocationsare identical. To
see this observe that the constraint in the second best problem (29) is identical to
oneof theﬁrst-orderconditionsin theﬁrst-bestproblem(26) and maximizing(30)
with respect to
t











the two allocations are identical, henceforth we will consider only the second-best
problem and refer to it as the efﬁcient outcome.
The efﬁcient outcome can either involve partial or universal adoption. Partial
adoption, or an interior solution, to the social optimum requires that the marginal
beneﬁt of increasing
t




1 . If it is positive then the efﬁcient



























￿ then the socially optimal network size





































































f then the socially optimal network size





















Proof. For the interior solution, integrate (28), substitute in the deﬁnition of
N
s
from the free entry constraint (29) and maximize with respect to
t
s.A ni n t e r i o r



















































































1and the efﬁcient solution is to maximize the size of the net-
work. The optimal number of software varieties when there is universal adoption








Proposition 4 Market adoption is inefﬁcient. This inefﬁciency manifests itself in
two ways: (i) The market network is smaller than the socially optimal network
when the market equilibrium does not involve universal adoption; and (ii) There
are parameter values where the social optimum involves universal adoption but
adoption in the market equilibrium is only partial.
Proof. Follows directly from comparing Proposition 2 to Proposition 3.
Proposition4 indicatesthatthe“virtualnetworks”whichexist inhardware/software
industriesare characterized by the same kind of inefﬁciency associated with phys-
ical networks. The inefﬁciencyarises forthesamereason: an adoptionexternality.
18The social planner considers not only the welfare of the marginal consumer, but
also the effect that extending the hardware network will have on the supply of
software, and hence the welfare of inframarginal consumers. In the market equi-
librium,marginalconsumersconsider only theirprivatebeneﬁt when making their
adoption decision.






































































































0. Increasing the extent of hardware
adoption will induce entry by additional software ﬁrms and a welfare increasing



















the increase in software varieties from increasing hardware adoption multiplied
by the product of the marginal utility of another software variety and the size of
the network. A social planner would be willing to subsidize network adoption in
order to increase the number of softwarevarieties, which beneﬁts all adopters, not
just the marginal adopter.
6.1 Subsidizing Hardware Adoption
That indirect network effects in these circumstances give rise to a positive adop-
tion externality suggest that a tax and subsidy scheme can be adopted that by
internalizing the externality results in an efﬁcient market equilibrium. Suppose
19that a subsidy of
s is offered to hardware adopters—that is the price of hardware
is reduced by
s—and it is ﬁnanced through a lump-sum tax. Then the demand for



















reﬂecting that the price of hardware is zero and adopters receive a payment of
s.


















































t for the social optimum is given by (31).












































5.T h em a r k e t
equilibrium has a network size less than 65% of the efﬁcient network size, with





















6.2 Understanding Indirect Network Externalities
Our analysis indicates that when market adoption leads to full coverage, there
is no inefﬁciency. In this case, the market outcome and the social outcome are
identical, and in particular, the number of software varieties are the same. This
is similar to the ﬁndings of Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) on the
optimality of monopolistic competition with an outside good. The market and
social optimum would be the same if the market coverage of hardwarein the mar-
ket equilibrium was the same as the socially optimal coverage: the number of
software products and their prices in the market equilibrium would be the same
20as those in the constrained optimum. Our inefﬁciency arises because the mar-
ket coverage of the hardware good is endogenous. Since the marginal consumer
only considers their private beneﬁt, there exists an externality and the extent of
coverage in the hardware market is less than optimal. Therefore, contrary to the
assertions of Liebowitz and Margolis (1994, 1995, 1998, 2002), indirect network
effects give rise to network externalities that are technological, not pecuniary,a n d
the equilibrium exhibits unexploited gains from trade regarding network partici-
pation.
Furthermore, the inefﬁciency of the market equilibrium in our model is not
attributable to market power. The price of software is above marginal cost in
order to ensure that software ﬁrms earn non-negative proﬁts, but it equals average
cost. Given the number of software varieties in the market equilibrium, the price
of software is efﬁcient. The inefﬁciency arises because there are too few software
varieties in the market equilibrium since the network size—extent of hardware
adoption—is too small.
The critical requirements for indirect network effects to give rise to an adop-
tion externality are three-fold: (i) increasing returns to scale in the production of
software; (ii) free-entry into software; and (iii) consumer preferences for software
variety. To illustrate the role of (i) assume that there is constant returns to scale in
the production of a software variety. Under these circumstances, the price of soft-
warewouldcontinueto bedetermined by thefreeentry,zero-proﬁtcondition. The
equilibrium number of software varieties would be the number required to equate
the marginal beneﬁt of software consumption to average cost and since average
cost does not vary with quantity because of constant returns to scale the equilib-
rium number of software varieties would be invariant to the number of consumers
who purchase hardware. The effect of the marginal adopter is to simply increase
sales of existing softwarevarieties, not thenumber of varieties. If thereis not free-
entry into software—requirement (ii)—then clearly an increase in the number of
adopters does not lead to an increase in the number of software varieties. With-
out a preference for software variety by consumers—requirement (iii)—the link
21from increased supply of software varieties to increased utility for all consumers
is broken. The additional demand for software from increased sales of hardware
would result only in a price effect—a pecuniary externality—not a variety effect
and a technological externality.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have presented a simple model that illustrates the circumstances
under which indirect network effects giverise to an adoption externality similar to
direct network effects. In doing so we challenge the conclusions of Liebowitz and
Margolis that indirect network effects are pecuniary externalities that do not have
welfare implications. The circumstances under which indirect network effects
give rise to a network externality are (i) increasing returns to scale in the produc-
tion of software; (ii) free-entry into software; and (iii) consumer preferences for
software variety. In our view these circumstances apply to most examples sug-
gested as illustrative of indirect network effects. By clarifying the circumstances
under which indirect network effects give rise to adoption externalities, this paper
provides the necessary foundation for the ongoing debate involving the broader
concern of how public policy should change—if at all—given the increasing im-
portance of industries characterized by indirect network effects in the economy.
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